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by SOPHIA S. CHANG*
Introduction
In New Jersey, March of 1988, Byron Halsey was convicted for the
brutal rape and murder of a seven-year-old girl and an eight-year-old boy.'
The evidence used to convict Halsey was his supposed confession, which
he gave after over thirty hours of interrogation and sleep deprivation.'
Halsey had to "guess several times" before he could correctly describe to
police how the crime occurred and other key facts. 3 However, the police-
prepared final written confession contained only the information that
Halsey finally guessed correctly, with no indication of any previous
inaccurate statements.4 The jury convicted him using that evidence.5 After
nineteen long years in prison, newly analyzed DNA test results proved
Halsey's innocence and implicated the actual killer.6
In the state of Alabama, Thomas Arthur was convicted of murder.7 At
the time of investigation, the victim's wife initially reported that a stranger,
who was not Arthur, broke into their home, raped her, and killed her
* J.D. Candidate 2009, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.S. cum
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I. Press Release, Innocence Project, After 19 Years in Prison for One of the Most Heinous







7. Press Release, Innocence Project, Alabama Governor's 45-Day Stay of Execution for
Thomas Arthur Should Immediately Lead to DNA Testing, Innocence Project Says (September
27, 2007), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/904.php.
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husband.8 The police did not believe her story, and she was eventually
charged and convicted of murdering her husband.9 Later, she changed her
version of the events and claimed that Arthur was the actual murderer; and,
as a result of her testimony, the victim's wife was released earlier than her
original sentence required.' 0 Implicated by the victim's wife, Arthur was
convicted and now faces the death penalty."
One cannot deny the possibility that the victim's wife lied. She
obviously had a strong motive-to get out of prison. There is, however,
one way to determine if the victim's wife's story was false. Samples of
DNA saved from the crime scene might show that Arthur was not
responsible for the murder. Analysis of the DNA evidence may prove that
Arthur did not commit the crime, and Arthur could be exonerated. The
DNA evidence could lead to Arthur's salvation. It would be an easy and
simple solution. Unfortunately, we may never know the truth. The state of
Alabama does not allow prisoners access to their DNA evidence, even if it
could demonstrate their innocence and serve as the key to set them free. 1
2
Eight states-Alabama, Alaska, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota and Wyoming-do not have laws
that allow convicted inmates access to DNA evidence. 13 They remain the
only states in the entire nation to deny post-conviction exoneration through
DNA evidence.' 4 The eight states not allowing DNA access are exercising
their sovereign rights contrary to the constitutional due process rights of its
citizens. Certainly, each state has the authority to enact its own criminal
laws and procedures. However, it does not serve justice when states
maintain policies that keep innocent people in prison. How unlucky of
people, like Thomas Arthur, to have the misfortune of living in one of those
states. If born in any other state, a wrongfully convicted person might find
exculpatory evidence that could prove his or her innocence. However, if
convicted in one of the above-named eight states, an innocent prisoner has
no chance of redemption. One can only imagine being wrongfully
convicted, forced into incarceration, and then told that the very evidence





12. See Solomon Moore, Exoneration Using DNA Brings Change in Legal System, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/01/us/01 exonerate.html?ei
=5090&en=4d3ce598c8354964&ex=1348891200&adxnnl=1&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pa
gewanted=all&adxnnlx= 1194498112-0sr/j+UCOBXAXYP 1 2nwW/A.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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Even though every state has the right to enact its own lavs, the laws on
post-conviction DNA evidence access should not be so different that some
states deny constitutional rights. The DNA evidence policies of all of the
states in the union should be standardized so that all of those wrongfully
convicted have a chance at proving their innocence. The denial of access
to evidence is a violation of due process. Incarcerating or executing
innocent inmates is cruel and unusual punishment, a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. It is unconstitutional for those eight states to keep the
innocent in prison, without giving them a chance to prove their innocence
with DNA evidence.
I. Background
"There is growing evidence that the dramatic rise in the number of
people being sent to prison has also resulted in an extraordinary increase in
the number of wrongful convictions, illegal sentences, and unjust
imprisonments. 15  There are many reasons why innocent people are
sometimes convicted for crimes they did not commit. Mistaken
identification was involved in eighty-one percent of the conviction cases
that were later overturned by DNA testing. 16 Eyewitnesses can have poor
memory or simply be mistaken in their recollection of events. 7
Additionally, a witness's perception can be affected or altered by any sort
of suggestive instructions or arrangements. 8  Despite these common
problems with eyewitness testimony, jurors still tend to believe them,
regardless of the possibility that the testimony is not completely accurate.1 9
Also, due to the low rates paid to defense attorneys representing indigent
defendants, some attorneys are not able or willing to commit the necessary
resources to their clients' cases. 20 As a result, the defendants sometimes do
not receive adequate representation and are therefore convicted. 21
Sometimes people give false confessions because they were coerced,
confused, or trying to protect others. Other reasons for wrongful
convictions include serology inclusion, "misconduct by the prosecution,
15. Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to
Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 339 (2006).
16. SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, INNOCENT: INSIDE WRONGFUL CONVICTION CASES 27 (2004).
17. Michael E. Kleinert, Note, Improving the Quality of Justice: The Innocence Protection
Act of 2004 Ensures Post-Conviction DNA Testing, Better Legal Representation, and Increased
Compensation for the Wrongfully Imprisoned, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 491, 497 (2006).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 497-98.
20. Id. at 498.
21. Id.
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police misconduct, defective science," and microscopic hair comparison.22
Because an individual could be wrongfully convicted for many reasons, it
is necessary to have "checks on the criminal justice system., 23 Errors are
bound to occur because the system is run by humans, and humans are
bound to make mistakes from time to time. There are problems with the
criminal justice system, and these problems sometimes result in false
convictions. "Unless there are modifications to existing.., state post-
conviction procedures, many innocent prisoners will be denied desperately
needed relief as a result of unjustifiable procedural defaults.,
24
In states where there are no laws giving convicted individuals a right
to DNA evidence, availability of DNA access is left to the discretion of the
state prosecutors, police officers, and court clerks.25 This poses a problem,
though, because many prosecutors are unwilling to challenge their own
verdicts.26 Thus, there is often resistance from prosecutors regarding
access to post-conviction DNA testing. 27  Even though prosecutors are
ethically bound to "seek the truth and ensure that justice is done,, 28 some
prosecutors are reluctant to reopen cases of those prisoners they have
already convicted. There are several reasons prosecutors use to justify their
decision of not allowing access to post-conviction DNA testing. Some
believe in finality.29 "DNA is rarely used as a post-conviction tool, in part
because prosecutors rarely pass up their right to vigorously oppose granting
a second chance to the prisoners they helped to convict., 30 They think that
since the inmate was already given a fair trial, he should not receive
another one. "[S]ome prosecutors may believe that exonerations
undermine the credibility of the system."'31 Exonerations can instill doubt
that the criminal justice system actually works as it should. Some DNA
exonerations disclose intentional misconduct by the police or prosecution
in obtaining the wrongful convictions.32 Many prosecutors may not want to
22. Id. at 497.
23. Id. at 499.
24. Stevenson, supra note 15, at 340.
25. Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence
and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 554 (2002).
26. Id. at 563.
27. Id. at 561-63.
28. Id. at 558.
29. Id. at 562.
30. Laura A. Bischoff & Tom Beyerlein, Evidence Preservation a Key Piece to Exoneration
Puzzle: Ohio's DNA Testing Law Also Closes Door to Many Potential Applicants, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, Dec. 16, 2007, at A12.
3 1. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 25, at 563.
32. Id.
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expose the flaws in the criminal justice system to the public. Additionally,
some are afraid that allowing access to DNA evidence will open the
floodgates to the courts and create a "slippery-slope effect."33 Therefore,
when left to the prosecutors' discretion, those wrongfully convicted may
never get a chance to prove their innocence.
National groups, such as the Innocence Project, have recently been
formed to help wrongfully convicted inmates obtain exoneration through
DNA evidence.3 4 This issue is a growing concern in the criminal law field.
To date, 223 people have been exonerated through DNA evidence testing,
and out of these 223, seventeen inmates were on death row.35 On average,
the convicted and then exonerated individuals served twelve years in
prison. 6 Groups like the Innocence Project do not simply provide legal
assistance to prisoners who wish to be exonerated, they aim to prevent
future injustice and suggest reform of the criminal procedure.
37
All of the states in the country, except the eight named above, have
statutes allowing inmates to analyze DNA evidence-though with varying
degrees of access.38 The general trend appears to be going toward giving
the mistakenly incarcerated a chance at freedom. This is likely because at
the time of many inmates' trials, DNA technology was either not available
or not dependable. Now, though, there has been vast improvement in DNA
analysis methods.39 Most states seem to have realized that those convicted
by possibly faulty eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence should
be allowed the opportunity to show that they are indeed not guilty of the
crime. Many people openly support DNA exoneration. Even the Governor
of Alabama, Bob Riley, supports post-conviction DNA testing, even
though his state is one of the eight which does not allow it.4° DNA
evidence may shed light on the case and provide answers that were not
33. Dylan Ruga, Note, Federal Court Adjudication of State Prisoner Claims for Post-
Conviction DNA Testing: A Bifurcated Approach, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 35, 50 (2004).
34. The Innocence Project Home Page, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Nov,
16, 2008).
35. The Innocence Project News and Resources, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php
(last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
36. Id.
37. The Innocence Project Home Page, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Nov.
16, 2008).
38. Moore, supra note 12.
39. The Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Unreliable and Limited Science,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Unreliable-Limited-Science.php (last visited Nov.
10, 2008).
40. Rick Harmon, Riley Won't Order DNA Testing, THE MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec.
29, 2007.
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available at the original time of trial.4 1 These statutes give wrongfully
convicted individuals a chance to redeem their name and rejoin society.
In addition, the federal government has also become involved in this
area. The federal Innocence Protection Act in the Justice For All Act of
2004 authorizes post-conviction DNA testing to qualified federal inmates,
providing rules and procedures for the process. 42 The Innocence Protection
Act ("IPA") was introduced as a legislative response to more than one
hundred cases in the nation where DNA evidence exonerated innocent
prisoners, some of whom were on death row and were within days of their
execution date.43 The Senate IPA bill provides, "It shocks the conscience
and offends social standards of fairness to deny inmates a right of access to
evidence for tests that could produce persuasive evidence of their
innocence."4  The IPA attempts to prevent unconstitutional and unjust
punishment by arguing that states should not deny prisoners access to DNA
evidence "if the proposed DNA testing has the scientific potential to
produce new, noncumulative evidence which is material to [the prisoner's
claim] that the prisoner did not commit [the offense], and which raises a
reasonable probability that the prisoner would not have been convicted.
45
Since our criminal system is imperfect, we must strive to make
improvements upon it, and the enacted IPA is a much needed start to help
protect innocent people.46 Under the IPA, convicted individuals are given
greater access to post-conviction DNA testing, and the federal government
provides grants to cover costs of DNA analysis.47 The court will order
DNA testing only if the applicant meets certain requirements.48 For
instance, the applicant must swear under penalty of perjury that he or she is
actually not guilty of the offense for which he or she was convicted.
49
Other requirements include the following: (1) the evidence must have been
retained from the investigation, (2) the evidence must not have been
already subjected to the type of DNA testing the applicant is suggesting, (3)
41. Matthew J. Mueller, Comment, Handling Claims of Actual Innocence: Rejecting
Federal Habeas Corpus as the Best Avenue for Addressing Claims of Innocence Based on DNA
Evidence, 56 CATH. U.L. REv. 227,251 (2006).
42. Innocence Protection Act of 2004, P.L. No. 108-405, §§ 411-12, 118 Stat. 2260, 2278-
85 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
43. Innocence Protection Act, S. 486, 107th Cong. § 103(a)(1)(E) (2002).
44. Id. § 103(a)(1)(K).
45. Id. § 103(b).
46. Kleinert, supra note 17, at 492.
47. Innocence Protection Act of 2004, P.L. No. 108-405, §§ 411-12, 118 Stat. 2260, 2278-
85 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
48. Id.§411(a).
49. Id.§411(a)(1).
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the evidence must have been properly stored so as not to be contaminated
or altered, (4) applicant must assert a defense not inconsistent with one
used at trial that would establish actual innocence, and (5) the applicant
must aver that the testing would show a probability that the applicant did
not commit the offense. 50 If it is later discovered that the applicant has lied,
then he or she will be sentenced to an additional period of around three
years.5' By imposing all of these requirements, the IPA ensures that guilty
people will not waste resources, while innocent people are given a chance
to prove that their conviction was a mistake.52 The enactment of the IPA
demonstrates that the federal government believes that in order to ensure
justice, convicted prisoners should be given the opportunity to access their
DNA evidence, test it, and prove their innocence.53 The IPA also strongly
urges states to implement the same policy by providing federal incentives
for states to allow permanent post-conviction DNA testing programs.54
The eight states that do not allow inmates access to possibly exculpatory
DNA evidence should take heed of the federal IPA. As we can see from
the legislative notes, there certainly is merit for implementing such a
policy. It also appears that most of the states in the country have followed
suit to also provide access to post-conviction DNA testing. The eight states
that have not should reconsider their policies and follow the examples set
by other states and the federal government.
II. Not Allowing Post-Conviction DNA Exoneration
Violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
Not allowing post-conviction DNA exoneration is unconstitutional
because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part, "No State shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. 55 The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause could be
deemed "the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence. 56 The
Court has stated that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to disclosure
51of all material evidence that could be favorable to the defendant's case.
50. Id. § 411 l(a).
51. Id. § 411(f)(3).
52. Kleinert, supra note 17, at 502-03.
53. Id. at 492.
54. Innocence Protection Act of 2004 § 413.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-
Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).
57. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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In Brady v. Maryland, defendant Brady was convicted of murder in the first
degree and was sentenced to death, even though he contended that another
person committed the actual killing. 58 Only after sentencing did Brady
discover that the other person's confession, which was in the prosecution's
possession, was withheld from him. 59 Brady submitted a motion for a new
trial based on the newly discovered evidence that had been kept from him
by the prosecution. 60 The Brady Court held that "the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution., 61 Similarly,
keeping exculpatory DNA evidence away from those wrongfully convicted
is a violation of due process. One may argue that there is a difference
because the Brady case involved evidence withheld during the initial trial,
whereas in the issue at hand the evidence comes up after conviction.
However, it is not a big stretch of the imagination to extend the concept to
post-conviction cases.
Although the Brady rule technically has not yet been applied to post-
conviction evidence, it follows that it would also be unconstitutional to
withhold evidence from one already convicted, just as it is unconstitutional
to suppress evidence from one currently facing trial. The DNA analysis
was not available to the prisoner at the time of his or her trial, so, in a way,
that evidence was withheld from him or her. When an individual is
innocent, it should not matter at what point in time the evidence becomes
available. If exonerating evidence exists, the innocent party deserves the
chance to view the evidence and prove his innocence. If a person is denied
access to any favorable evidence, then that person is effectively denied full
access to the courts. 62 It is unconstitutional to convict someone and uphold
the conviction, without granting him access to exonerating evidence and
thus the full court system. This surely amounts to depriving a person of
liberty, and for those on death row, life, without due process of law.
The violation of due process also applies to the destruction of DNA
evidence. "When identity is an issue at trial and the police permit the
destruction of evidence that could eliminate the defendant as the
perpetrator, such loss is material to the defense and is a denial of due
process., 63 DNA evidence can play an integral role in identification. It can
58. Id. at 84.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 87.
62. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 25, at 570.
63. State v. Escalante, 734 P.2d 597, 603 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
[Vol. 36:2
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either name the perpetrator or exonerate one wrongfully accused. Even
though the prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence that is in the
defendant's favor, the Supreme Court has previously held that "unless a
criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to
preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due
process of law."
64
However, there is a strong argument that the failure to preserve
evidence should be considered a violation of due process. In Arizona v.
Youngblood, defendant Youngblood was convicted of child molestation,
sexual assault, and kidnapping a ten-year-old boy.65 The evidence used to
implicate Youngblood, who claimed he was innocent, was photographic
identification from the victim. 66 Even though evidence from the rape had
been collected, it was not properly refrigerated and was therefore lost for
evidentiary purposes.6 7 The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction on the basis that had the DNA samples been preserved, the jury
could have reached another conclusion.68 However, the Supreme Court
reversed again, concluding that the defendant must show bad faith in order
to prevail on a constitutional claim. 69 The dissent, on the other hand, urged
that "[t]he Constitution requires that criminal defendants be provided with
a fair trial, not merely a 'good faith' try at a fair trial."7 ° If one is denied an
opportunity to present a full defense, then one is deprived the right of due
process. 71 The dissent argued that the prosecution's ineptitude of properly
storing and maintaining DNA evidence interfered with the defendant's
ability to present a complete defense.72 A defendant deserves to see all of
the relevant evidence that could implicate or exonerate him or her.
Similarly, one who is already in prison should have the right to access
to DNA evidence that could likely prove their innocence. Keeping a
person away from the DNA evidence in his case is effectively like
destroying the evidence. If no one is allowed access to it, the evidence
might as well not exist. There is no utility in keeping evidence properly
stored if it is never looked at or analyzed again. However, one could argue
that it is even worse than having no evidence at all. The convicted inmates
64. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
65. Id. at 52.
66. Id. at 53.
67. Id. at 54.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 58.
70. Id. at 61 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 69-70.
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have knowledge of the evidence and are instead taunted forever by the fact
that they will never be able to access it and prove their innocence. It is true
that at the time of the criminal trial, DNA analysis may not have been
available or trustworthy, so no one would argue that the prosecution acted
in bad faith. However, now that forensic testing is available, the inmates
deserve a chance to utilize all of the evidence in its entirety. Knowingly
preventing a prisoner from proving his or her innocence by denying access
to possibly exculpatory evidence is tantamount to acting in bad faith during
the original criminal proceeding because, in both circumstances, the
government is actively preventing the accused from having a fair chance of
proving his or her innocence. Denying access to DNA evidence violates
due process and, therefore, is unconstitutional.
Thus, withholding evidence is unconstitutional. When there is a
possibility that DNA analysis could prove a person's innocence, that DNA
evidence is material to a person's case, regardless of whether that person
has already been convicted. Denying prisoners, who claim they are
innocent, access to DNA evidence constitutes taking away their liberty
without giving them a proper chance at possible exoneration. Not allowing
access to DNA evidence violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and it is a denial of the full justice system. The policies of the
eight states that do not allow post-conviction DNA exoneration are
unconstitutional.
III. Recent Federalization of State Criminal Law
The United States is a federalist government. Each individual state,
through reserved power, has the right to enact its own laws and act as
sovereign over its own citizens.73 Traditionally, criminal laws for state
crimes have been left to the states to decide.74 States have the general
police power, while the federal government is more limited. However, the
states are not completely free to do whatever they please. The states must
also abide by the United States Constitution.75 Congress has legislative
power when the matter is within Congress's authority under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.76 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held
73. Timothy Zick, Active Sovereignty, 21 ST. JOHN'S J.L COMM. 541, 542 (2007).
74. Jerold Israel, Federal Influence in State Cases: Sentencing, Prosecution, and Procedure:
Federal Criminal Procedure as a Modelfor the States, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
130, 131 (1996).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 132.
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that state criminal procedure laws are all subject to the Bill of Rights, due
to incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.77
State criminal law has become more regulated by the judicial branch
over the last four decades, and the courts will continue insisting on
maintaining constitutional rights.78 The Supreme Court has enforced
federally guaranteed minimum procedural rights in state criminal cases.79
There is a line of recent cases that indicate that the Supreme Court is
concerned with the constitutionality of state criminal laws. ° In City of
Chicago v. Morales, the Court struck down a Chicago loitering ordinance,
using the constitutional "void-for-vagueness" principle. 81 Another example
includes Atkins v. Virginia, where the Court invalidated a statute that
authorized the execution of mentally retarded individuals.82 Most recently,
in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down Texas's statute that
criminalized sodomy.83 The Court has defined constitutionally protected
conduct by placing protective limitations on state criminal power.84 "The
Constitution contemplates that the federal government will have a limited
(although important) sphere of interest to protect., 85 Even though each
state is entitled to implement its own criminal laws, which may differ
greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, those laws still must comply with
constitutional rights. We have seen a progression of federal intervention in
state criminal jurisprudence. Therefore, suggesting that the eight states
forego a bit of their state sovereignty by adopting post-conviction DNA
exoneration laws in order to uphold constitutional rights is not shocking or
novel. These states would simply be doing exactly what many states have
already been doing for the past fifty years.
State sovereignty is an important element of our government, but it
should not be upheld at the price of the rights of the citizens of the United
States. "[W]here defendants merely seek access to potentially
determinative exculpatory evidence that rests in the exclusive possession of
the State[,] ... arbitrary denial of access to DNA evidence that could
77. Id.
78. James A. Strazzella, The Influence of Federal Law on the Dual Criminal Justice System:
The Recent Past and the Emerging Future, 10 DIGEST 29, 30 (2002).
79. Id. at 31.
80. Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 509, 512 (2004).
81. City ofChicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999).
82. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
83. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 588, 579 (2003).
84. Strazzella, supra note 78, at 37.
85. Id. at 39.
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demonstrate innocence falls outside the sphere of local autonomy.
Although states generally have the power to enact their own laws, they
should not be able to when the result is unconstitutional.
IV. The Rights of Prisoners
In his article Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment,
Markus Dirk Dubber claims that the principle behind constitutional
criminal law is dignity of the person.87 Human dignity is a property shared
by all persons.88 It is a naturally occurring condition, not bestowed upon us
by society or government, and therefore it cannot be taken away, unlike
social dignity. 89 "Constitutional law marks the realm of principles of
justice, 90 so personal dignity is the backbone of constitutional criminal
law. 9' The purpose of state implementation of criminal law is protection of
its citizens' lives, liberties, and property and the guarantee of personal
rights.92 However, "[i]n protecting one person's right, it must not disregard
the right of another. To put it differently, not only the victim has rights as a
person, so does the offender., 93 Even though an offender loses respect
from others in society, he preserves his human dignity, no matter how
much social dignity he has lost.94 In application of this principle to the
topic of this Note, those people who are convicted and placed behind bars
may be deprived of rights by the government, but they can never be denied
their basic human rights. As alleged offenders, they should be treated with
dignity, as humans. They should have the opportunity to proclaim their
innocence, and if exculpatory evidence exists, then that evidence should be
available to them as proof. The mere fact that they are already locked up
for a crime does not make them any less deserving of human rights and
dignity.
Dubber maintains that the state is authorized to use the criminal law
for no other purpose than to protect its citizens.95 The Constitution places
limits on those punishments a state may inflict upon a person who is
86. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 25, at 612.
87. Dubber, supra note 80, at 515.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 532.
91. Id. at 516.
92. Id. at 537.
93. Id. at 538.
94. Id. at 547.
95. Id. at 555.
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convicted of a crime. 96 The Eighth Amendment states that cruel and
unusual punishments cannot be inflicted.97 Keeping an innocent person in
prison can be construed as cruel and unusual punishment. Imprisonment
and serving out a sentence for a crime one did not commit is indeed cruel
and unusual-wasting time in a prison cell, day after day, all the time
knowing that it should not be. It is cruel to have to live with that sort of
injustice for years, or even for the rest of one's life. It is unusual because
most people are punished for crimes they did commit, not for crimes of
which they are innocent. Furthermore, many prisoners who maintain their
innocence are also sentenced to death. To be executed for a crime that one
did not commit is certainly cruel and unusual. The Supreme Court has held
that "punishment is excessive and unconstitutional if it is nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering" 98 or if
it is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." 99
In addition, the Court has held that the cruel and unusual punishment
protections of the Eighth Amendment do not desist once a person has been
validly convicted and sentenced. 00  Just because someone is already
imprisoned does not mean that the Eighth Amendment provisions do not
apply. Keeping an innocent person in prison has no purpose other than
punishing that person for a crime that he or she did not commit. This
punishment constitutes unnecessary pain and suffering. There is no reason
why an innocent person should have to serve time and pay for a crime he or
she is not guilty of. If a person is innocent, the punishment is excessive
and unconstitutional. Denying prisoners access to DNA evidence that
could set them free simply prolongs the punishment, when the punishment
was not even theirs to bear in the first place. Keeping possibly exculpatory
evidence from inmates ensures that their pain and suffering will continue,
with no regard to whether it is actually necessary. If the evidence can show
that they were wrongfully convicted, then there is no need for those
prisoners to remain incarcerated. Denying post-conviction DNA
exoneration prolongs cruel and unusual punishment and is therefore
unconstitutional.
96. Id. at 558.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
98. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977).
99. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
100. Johnston v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 585-86 (1988).
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V. Prohibition of Post-Conviction DNA Exoneration is Contrary
to the Goals of Criminal Justice
This phenomenon works against the ultimate goal of our criminal
justice system. "After all, the central purpose of any system of criminal
justice is to convict the guilty and free the innocent."10' Refusing to allow
wrongfully convicted prisoners access to DNA evidence that may prove
their innocence does not benefit society. The innocent party is forced to
remain in jail, while the actual culprit runs free, paying no consequences
for his illicit actions. At an Oklahoma'0 2 Bar Association meeting, Policy
Director Stephen Saloom stated, "The only person who benefits from a
wrongful conviction is the real perpetrator."'
0 3
Keeping the innocent behind bars not only affects the wrongfully
convicted, but also family and friends. For instance, contemplate the story
of Kirk Bloodsworth, who was the first man to be exonerated through the
use of DNA technology. In 1984, Bloodsworth was arrested for the brutal
rape and murder of a nine-year-old girl. 0 4 Maintaining his innocence and
feeling he had nothing to hide, Bloodsworth defiantly showed his face
while walking through a throng of cameras and reporters. 0 5 Therefore,
everyone in the community saw that Bloodsworth had been arrested for
such a horrendous crime, including his friends. Bloodsworth was
convicted based on eyewitness identification, despite having an alibi
supported by several witnesses and the prosecution's lack of corroborating
physical evidence. 0 6 He received a sentence of death, it appears, because
he looked like the real culprit. 10 7 In 1992, eight years later, Bloodsworth's
lawyer successfully convinced the prosecution to allow forensic testing of
DNA evidence, using methods that had previously been unavailable.' 0 8
The DNA testing proved that Bloodsworth was innocent. 0 9 Unfortunately
Bloodsworth's mother died before he was exculpated, but his father was
101. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993) (citing United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S.
225, 230 (1975)).
102. Oklahoma remains one of the eight states that do not allow prisoners access to DNA
evidence.
103. Marie Price, Oklahoma Bar Association Urged to Tackle Wrongful Convictions, J.
REcoRD, Nov. 9, 2007.
104. John T. Rago, "Truth or Consequences" and Post-Conviction DNA Testing: Have You
Reached Your Verdict?, 107 DICK. L. REv. 845, 859, 862 (2003).
105. Id. at 862.
106. Id. at 863-64.
107. Id. at 864.
108. Id. at 866-67.
109. Id. at 867.
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finally able to see him walk out of jail free. 10  After his release,
Bloodsworth wrote, "I can never get back what was taken from me. My
mother and my uncle died while I was wrongfully imprisoned. They
always knew I was innocent, but they never saw me walk out of prison a
vindicated man."1" One can only imagine if Bloodsworth had not been
allowed to test the DNA evidence. He would have remained in prison for
the rest of his life. The public, including his friends, would have forever
labeled him a rapist and murderer. Neither of his parents would have ever
seen their son exonerated. They would have spent their life savings on
lawyers for their son, with no success. Who knows? Over time,
Bloodsworth's parents might have even given up, believed he was guilty,
and rejected their son for a crime he did not commit. Keeping innocent
people in prison affects more than just the convicted individual. It can
destroy relationships, businesses, and families. An innocent person's
reputation is destroyed, while the person truly responsible for the crime
remains free to live in society without consequence, or even worse, to
strike again.
Not allowing inmates the opportunity to prove their innocence
contradicts a fundamental value of the American criminal justice system-
that it is better to let a guilty defendant go free than to convict an innocent
person. " 2 In the words of Judge Learned Hand, "Our procedure has always
been haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal
dream."' 3 This principle is why the criminal justice system works on a
presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reasonable doubt is "that state of the case, which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of
jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction,
to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge."' 14 In order to conclude that
someone is guilty of a crime, there can be no reasonable doubt that he or
she may actually be innocent. Reasonable doubt is introduced when those
convicted maintain that, if analyzed, DNA evidence could prove their
innocence. Therefore, we are not following the foundational criminal
principle of certainty of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when we deny
inmates access to the evidence that could establish their innocence.
110. Id. at 868.
111. Kirk Bloodsworth, My 20-Year Journey, THE TULSA WORLD, Sept. 21, 2003, at G3,
available at http://www.tulsaworld.com/opinion/article.aspx?articlelD=03092 lOp__g3_my2oy.
112. Rago, supra note 104, at 848 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
113. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
114. Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (1 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850).
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Of course, the jury and judge are only human and are bound to make
mistakes from time to time. However, an understanding of the inevitable
flaws of the criminal justice system is not the same as tolerating the
conviction of people who are actually innocent." 5 We know that mistakes
happen, but instead of merely accepting those mistakes, we should attempt
to fix them. Pretending that the mistakes never occurred and that no
injustice exists does not solve anything. Edwin M. Borchard states,
I have long urged that the State or community assume the risks of
official wrongdoing and error instead of permitting the losses
resulting from such fault or mistake to be born by the injured
individual alone. Among the most shocking of such injuries are
erroneous criminal convictions of innocent people. 
116
Instead of denying wrongfully convicted inmates access to DNA
evidence that may exonerate them, the states should act to right a wrong.
Our criminal justice system demands that we ensure that we only punish
those who are indeed guilty. It does not support a policy of keeping
innocent people in prison, without even a chance to show that they could be
in prison for something they did not do. Therefore, prisoners should not be
denied access to DNA evidence, if that evidence could prove their
innocence.
Many believe that we should not create doubt in the criminal justice
system by exonerating those already convicted. Finality is an essential part
of the system," 7 because victims need to obtain closure, and the aims of
criminal law are retribution and deterrence." 8 However, although finality
is important, it does not overshadow protection of the innocent. "The
protection of innocence has been the touchstone of due process in the
criminal justice system."" 9 Finality should not bar review when an inmate
has a "colorable claim of innocence.' 120 Therefore, the interest of finality
does not outweigh the more important goal of ensuring that the innocent
are not wrongfully imprisoned.
Others reject DNA exoneration because of the perceived increase in
administrative costs and burdens. Authorities claim that prisoners are
115. See Rago, supra note 104, at 853.
116. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at
vii-viii (1932).
117. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986).
118. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 25, at 606.
119. Id. at 588.
120. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 142 (1970).
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simply trying to delay the inevitable conviction, so access to evidence
should be restricted. 2 ' Skeptics believe that guilty inmates will abuse the
system if they are allowed to reopen their cases for analysis of DNA
evidence. For those who believe the costs will be massive, the burden is
not as great as one might imagine. Depending on the type of analysis, the
cost of DNA tests range from one hundred dollars to fifteen hundred
dollars. 22 True, there would be a large number of convicted individuals
wanting access to their DNA evidence now. However, as time goes by, the
number of requests for testing will decrease drastically. There will be
many prisoners interested in testing now because this newly developed
technology was otherwise unavailable at the time of many of their original
trials. But, DNA evidence is so prevalent now that DNA found at the scene
of a crime is automatically gathered and tested when the police are
attempting to find the perpetrator. There will be little need to test DNA
evidence post-conviction in the future, because the DNA will have already
been tested prior to conviction. The number of cases requiring post-
conviction DNA analysis will decrease over time; therefore, the
administrative burdens will also decrease. It is true that allowing prisoners
access to DNA evidence may increase the workload in the short term, but it
will hardly run out of control. Instead, the additional administrative
burdens will eventually taper off to minimal amounts.
In addition, those prisoners who know they are guilty but choose to
test DNA from the crime anyway will not necessarily be wasting the
government's resources. Law enforcement officials may use the newly
discovered information to connect the prisoners to other crimes that had,
until then, been unsolved.1 23 In addition, with the release of innocent
inmates, the administrative costs and burdens of maintaining prisoners
during incarceration will be greatly diminished. Providing the means for
post-conviction DNA exoneration not only fulfills the aims of criminal
justice, but also results in an economic benefit, which could then be
reinvested into the criminal justice system. Prohibition of access to DNA
evidence only hinders criminal justice.
VI. Problems with Other Methods of Exoneration
Some people may argue that it is not necessary for states to provide
access to post-conviction DNA testing to prisoners because there are other
121. Stevenson, supra note 15, at 339.
122. Kimberly Powell, DNA Family Trees, About.com, http://genealogy.about.com/cs/
geneticgenealogy/a/dna-tests.htm.; Frontline, What Jennifer Saw, Frequently Asked Questions by
The Innocence Project, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dna/etc/faqs.html.
123. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 25, at 611.
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avenues through which they can pursue exoneration, such as habeas corpus
and state clemency.
A. Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus allows a prisoner to obtain habeas review in federal
court, claiming that his or her incarceration violates the United States
Constitution.124  The purpose of habeas corpus is to protect innocent
defendants and deter official constitutional misconduct or errors. 25 A writ
of habeas corpus is available when a petitioner shows a violation of his or
her constitutional rights and a reasonable probability of innocence., 26 The
writ was extended to state criminal cases by the Habeas Corpus Act of
1867, providing that a federal court could determine that even though a
state prisoner might have been convicted on a facially valid state law, the
confinement is nevertheless in violation of the federal constitution. 27 The
Act states, "[T]he several courts of the United States ... shall have power
to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution."'' 28 However,
history shows that the Supreme Court was somewhat reluctant to apply
habeas review to state criminal cases. 129 In Frank v. Mangum, defendant
Frank appealed his state conviction, alleging that the trial had been
influenced by disorder and violent sentiments. 130 The Supreme Court
denied habeas for Frank, but also stated that if the state failed to provide
corrective process, then habeas could be available.13' In dictum, the Court
stated, "[I]f the State, supplying no corrective process, carries into
execution a judgment of death or imprisonment based upon a verdict thus
produced by mob domination, the State deprives the accused of his life or
liberty without due process of law.'
32
Later, in Moore v. Dempsey, the Court granted a state criminal
defendant habeas review of his detention. 133 However, even though habeas
124. Joseph L. Hoffnan & Lauren K. Robel, Federal Influence in State Cases: Sentencing,
Prosecution, and Procedure: Federal Court Supervision of State Criminal Justice Administration,
543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 154, 156 (1996).
125. Id. at 163.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 156.
128. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
129. See Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review
Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1079, 1139 (1995).
130. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 316 (1915).
131. Id. at335.
132. Id.
133. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923).
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corpus has been extended to state criminal cases, the Court has also held
"that the judgment of state courts in criminal cases will not be reviewed on
habeas corpus merely because some right under the Constitution of the
United States is alleged to have been denied to the person convicted. 134 In
other words, the federal courts will not review just any state criminal
defendant who claims that he or she does not belong in prison. The
Supreme Court has limited the application of habeas corpus to state
convicts with procedural constitutional claims. The function of habeas
review is to ensure that people are not detained in a constitutionally
violating manner.' 35 However, in Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court
decided that claims of actual innocence are not constitutional claims.1 36 In
Herrera, defendant Herrera was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. 137  Herrera sought habeas review, alleging that he was actually
innocent and his deceased brother was the real culprit.13 8 He offered his
brother's confession as evidence., 39  With no additional constitutional
claims, this allegation was a freestanding assertion of actual innocence. 
140
The Herrera Court rejected the habeas petition because there was no
constitutional claim. 141
Herrera demonstrates that "federal habeas review only protects
criminal defendants from trial error that deprived the petitioner of
procedural due process of law guaranteed by the United States
Constitution."', 42  Habeas corpus cannot be used by those who simply
proclaim that they are factually innocent. Like Herrera, wrongfully
convicted people who could be exonerated by DNA evidence are not likely
to obtain habeas review. DNA tests proving a prisoner's innocence are
similar to the confession letter written by Herrera's brother. However,
inmates in the named eight states who have made claims of actual
innocence, rather than procedural constitutional claims, will most likely be
unable to obtain habeas review and, therefore, not be exonerated through
this channel.
134. Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 447 (1925).
135. Eli Paul Mazur, "I'm Innocent": Addressing Freestanding Claims of Actual Innocence
in State and Federal Courts, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 197, 223 (2003).
136. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993).
137. Id. at 393.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 396.
140. Id. at 401.
141. Id. at416.
142. Mazur, supra note 135, at 238.
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B. State Clemency
Other people arguing against DNA exoneration might contend that
wrongfully convicted prisoners can always be pardoned via state clemency.
Michael Heise notes in his study that clemency is an extrajudicial avenue
that exists to correct legal errors and ensure justice. 43 The idea behind
clemency is that "the public interest would be better served by sparing the
life of the condemned than by taking it.' 144 Clemency requires that the
decision maker obtain all accurate information about the crime, the
prisoner, and societal needs in order to choose whether to exonerate the
condemned individual. 145 Therefore, the clemency process is by nature a
political creature. 146 Clemency policies vary greatly from state to state.
Some states give their governors sole clemency power, others assign
clemency authority to administrative boards, and the rest use a hybrid
system with both governor and agency having clemency authority.
47
Executive authorities responsible for clemency exercise their discretionary
power with almost no checks from the courts. 148 The clemency power is
not a judicial procedure, nor is it subject to judicial review. 149 Faced with
the exact same case and facts, one governor may decide one way while
another governor may decide the opposite. 1
50
The clemency procedure seems to be solely discretionary and with no
guidelines or reassurances. The U.S. Attorney General's manual aptly
states, "[Clemency] authority has never been crystallized into rigid rules.
Rather, its function has been to break rules.'' In addition, political factors
often influence clemency decisions.' 52 Heise's study further illustrates that
many other variables affect clemency determinations. 153  For instance,
political and structural variables, defendants' backgrounds, and a bias in
favor of women all play a role in clemency decision making. 54  It is
143. Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and Its
Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 252 (2003).
144. Deborah Leavy, Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Due Process Protection in Capital
Clemency Proceedings, 90 YALE L. J. 889, 893 (1981).
145. Id. at 892.
146. Id. at 893.
147. Heise, supra note 143, at 255.
148. Leavy, supra note 144, at 891.
149. Mazur, supra note 135, at216.
150. Id. at 217.
151. Heise, supra note 143, at 254 (citing 3 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES: PARDON 295 (1939)).
152. Mazur, supra note 135, at 216-17.
153. Heise, supra note 143, at 307.
154. Id.
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difficult to assess the correctness or quality of clemency decision
making.15 5 The clemency process does not allow the prisoner to have an
attorney, be aware of the information adverse to his case, appear personally
before the decision maker to plead his case, have notice, or be present at a
hearing. 156 The person affected by the determination has no chance to
correct or rebut any of the information the decision is based upon. 157 The
prisoner is basically at the mercy of the clemency decision maker, with no
power to help his own case.
The inconsistency and seemingly arbitrary decision making involved
in state clemency does not make it a reassuring method for possible
exoneration. Of course, a prisoner does have a slight chance at obtaining
exoneration, but clemency is quite rare, and the prisoner is unable to
provide any input. In addition, without DNA evidence proving their
innocence, the inmates have a low probability of prevailing in a clemency
plea. Unless the state offers the DNA evidence for testing during the
clemency process, the convicted individuals will have nothing more than
the facts from the case-facts that convicted them in the first place. The
wrongfully convicted deserve an opportunity to prove their innocence, and
it does not seem that state clemency can provide them with a fair chance.
Therefore, convicted prisoners should be allowed access to their DNA
evidence, because other methods of exoneration are not likely to lead to
successful results. If denied the opportunity to analyze DNA from their
case, a wrongfully convicted prisoner will have slim chances of
exoneration.
Conclusion
Should people just move to a state they know has post-conviction
DNA laws, and hope that they are never falsely implicated in a crime in
one of the other eight states? What happens if one is so unfortunate as to
be falsely convicted of a crime one did not commit? Something this
important should not be left up to luck or chance. Our country ought to
have a more unified policy, one where it does not matter if you live in
Kentucky or Oklahoma. If a person is innocent, he or she deserves the
opportunity to prove that he or she did not commit the crime. If the use of
DNA analysis may confirm innocence, then access should be allowed.
Anything less would be unjust.
"[T]he local democratic process can be an effective means by which
the citizens of a state can determine for themselves when a claim of
155. Leavy, supra note 144, at 899.
156. Id.at901.
157. Id.
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innocence based on new evidence warrants the protection of post-
conviction safeguards." 158  However, individual state statutes may not
provide enough protection for the innocent. State policies regarding post-
conviction DNA evidence vary immensely on degrees of access. The
practice among the states is divergent. 159 But, every citizen of the United
States deserves the same opportunity to prove his or her innocence. One's
chance for redemption and freedom should not depend on which state he or
she is convicted in. If a convict is innocent, he or she should be allowed
the chance to prove it, no matter where incarcerated, throughout every state
in the country. It is ludicrous to think that one's fate can rest solely on
geography. All of the states in the nation should provide prisoners access
to exonerating DNA evidence. The states ought to provide a fair and just
system, not one that can be likened to a lucky (or unlucky) roll of the dice.
The Supreme Court has not yet recognized a right to counsel for those
who believe they have been wrongfully convicted. 160 However, one cannot
deny that those who are innocent deserve a chance to prove their
innocence. Disclosure of DNA evidence does not ensure that people in jail
will be freed, but at least it gives them the chance to show that they are
innocent. Without the opportunity to access the DNA evidence, wrongfully
convicted prisoners will be eternally stuck in jail, without any hope.
This Note does not contend that there should be uniform state statutes
for all aspects of law. However, in this very specific area of post-
conviction DNA exoneration, the importance of protecting the innocent
outweighs the states' rights to create their own laws denying prisoners
access to exculpatory DNA evidence. State sovereignty is an extremely
important aspect of our government. Nevertheless, one must remember
that a government is not comprised solely of statutes and regulations. Our
government consists of, and is sustained by, its people. A state's right to
enact whatever laws it wishes is still limited by the fundamental
constitutional rights of its citizens. Denying post-conviction DNA
exoneration constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights to life and
liberty. The innocent should not be left to rot in prison for crimes they did
not commit. The innocent must be protected.
158. Mueller, supra note 41, at 259.
159. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410 (1993).
160. Stevenson, supra note 15, at 353.
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